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Environmental Realpolitik:
Joint Implementation and Climate Change
THOMAS C. HELLER*
Professor Heller's article discusses why there has been little
progress after the Rio Earth Summit in developing the Framework
Convention on Climate Change. He argues that, beyond the scientific
uncertainties about climate change and its economic impacts,
agreement on the legal structure of a comprehensive regime has been
hampered by institutional factors. These include: the political
discounting of damage to future populations, the diverse risks of
global warming in different regions, and the distrust in many nations
with market instruments, like taxes or tradable permits, that are
favored by many industrial nations dependent on fossil fuels.
Resolving these problems will be particularly difficult in multilateral
negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. This is due to
the conflation of environmental issues with a broader, contested
agenda of North-South issues. Unless this impasse is overcome in the
near term, key nations, essential to a successful mitigation regime,
may abandon collective solutions and invest in local adaptations to
climate change. Heller argues that Joint Implementation (JI), a type
of tradable permit system, can help to break this deadlock. However,
investment in JIprojects has been slow due to political opposition and
to confusion about the nature of an international market in
environmental services. The article concludes with an outline for the
development of a JI market that does not require a prior multilateral
consensus.
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for International Studies.
The author thanks the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) with which he
works on the International Business Action for Climate Change initiative. The views expressed in this
article are the author's and not those of the WBCSD.
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At the Rio Earth Summit (Rio) in 1992, the international community
began constructing a global regime to deal with the risk of climate change.
The task is recognized as notoriously complex and difficult.' The complexity
arises in part from the uncertainty that surrounds the scientific understanding
of climate change. It also reflects the political context of deregulation, the
transition of many states from autocracy and economic controls to markets and
democracy, and the heightened international economic competition in those
nations whose commitment is most essential to an effective and comprehensive
regime. Since Rio, these difficulties have resulted in the slow, perhaps
illusory, progress toward defining the obligations of signatory parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the nature of the legal
instruments by which their commitments to mitigate the emission of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) might be carried out.' Among the instruments that
1. See generally MICHAEL OPPENHEIMER & ROBERT H. BOYLE, DEAD HEAT: THE RACE AGAINST
THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT (1990) (discussing the imperative for action to stop the trend of global warming
in the face of industrialization and scientific uncertainty about the future); STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL
WARMING: ARE WE ENTERING THE GREENHOUSE CENTURY? (1989) (noting the difficulties posed by climate
change and the balancing of environmental, social, political, and economic concerns in looking for a
solution); Symposium, Energy and the Environment: Intersecting Global Issues, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 1, 1-281 (1992).
2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties: Decisions
Adopted by the First Session (Berlin), Mar. 28-Apr. 7, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1671; United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
849 [hereinafter FCCC]; see also Daniel M. Bodansky, The Emerging Climate Change Regime, 20 ANN.
REV. ENERGY & ENV'T 425 (1995). In the Framework Convention, a limited number of developed nations
(Annex I Parties) agreed to make good faith efforts to achieve some soft target, to which no legal obligations
attach. This would be related to stabilization of GHG emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. No
commitments beyond that year were assumed by any party and no targets of any form were undertaken by
less developed nations. In Annex I nations, national plans to implement their soft obligations are
overwhelmingly focused on voluntary compliance by their domestic emitters. No domestic tradable permit
systems or taxes specifically for GHGs have been put in place. Rather, key Annex I nations have relied on
existing programs like the sulfur dioxide controls of the United States' Clean Air Act of 1990 as prime
sources of GHG reductions. See CLIMATE ACTION REPORT: SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 75-105 (1994)
[hereinafter U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT]; THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, JAPAN'S ACTION REPORT ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 75-135 (1994); EOP GROUP, INC., MEASURING UP TO THE YEAR 2000 AIM OF THE
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EIGHT SELECTED
NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS (forthcoming 1996). Similarly, as the siting of new nuclear plants has become
more difficult, Japan has begun to look to international trading in GHG emissions in part because it
contributes to the reduction of Chinese sulfur dioxide emissions that are upwind of Japanese forests.
Moreover, some firms with extended time horizons have pushed toward self-regulation of GHG risks in
order to forestall public mandatory regulation of GHG emissions. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
In spite of these gains, it has become apparent that no major industrial nation will comply with its soft
2000 target. See UNITED STATES CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK & CLIMATE NETWORK EUROPE, INDEPENDENT
NGO EVALUATIONS OF NATIONAL PLANS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION (1995). Many developed
nations, including the United States, face rising demands for energy that have elicited plans for supply based
JOINT IMPLEMENTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE
have been subjects of continuing controversy is Joint Implementation (JI).
Joint Implementation (sometimes called Activities Implemented Jointly) is a
clumsy and alienating way of expressing an idea that is elegant and familiar.
JI is simply an application of the normal principles of international trade to the
problem of greenhouse gas mitigation.
Unlike other gases such as sulfur dioxide, whose noxious effects are
suffered locally and regionally depending upon where they are emitted, the
world's atmosphere serves as a unitary sink for GHGs3 Although the
economic and social impacts of living in a warmer environment do relate to
particular factors such as proximity to sea coasts, the degree of temperature
change caused by ongoing high rates of GHG emissions is independent of
where the emissions occur. In effect, the beneficial effects of reducing
emissions anywhere in the world are equivalent to reducing emissions locally.
From a scientific standpoint, there is no reason to favor emissions
mitigation in any particular location. To understand the simple economic logic
of JI, let us imagine that there is an actor in some nation that has accepted an
obligation to reduce its GHG emissions to a lower level than that nation would
have produced if business as usual continued. For purposes of definition, we
need not be concerned with why the actor takes on some part of the national
commitment. To make sense of JI, we must only assume that the actor may
legally satisfy whatever obligation is accepted by investing in one or more of
a portfolio of similarly effective emissions mitigating options, with differential
costs in various regions of the world. With an international market in GHG
reduction services, a rational actor may make use of the theory of comparative
heavily on coal that will produce emissions growth. See Ralph Cavanagh et al., Utilities and CO2 Emissions:
Who Bears the Risks of Future Regulation?, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 1993, at 64, 68-7 1. There may even be
policy changes, such as the introduction of retail wheeling in the deregulation of American energy markets,
that can lead to GHG increases in the targeted period. See RALPH CAVANAGH, NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL, THE GREAT "RETAIL WHEELING" ILLUSION-AND MORE PRODUCrTIVE ENERGY FUTURES
(1994). In the face of weak multilateral commitments and weaker national implementation, the slow
opening of Joint Implementation (JI) markets remains one of the few initiatives in climate change mitigation.
3. Because other pollutants such as SO, and NO, do not diffuse uniformly in the atmosphere, trading
in emissions rights for these gases can be more complex. See T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN
EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 203 (1985); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did
All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989);
Marc A. Levy, International Co-operation to Combat Acid Rain, in GREEN GLOBE YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 59 (Helge Ole Bergesen & Georg
Parmann eds., 1995); James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful
Transferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 388-90 (1989); Carlos A. Gavilondo, Comment,
Trading Clean Air - The 1990 Acid Rain Rules: How They Will Work and Initial Responses to the Market
System, 67 TUL. L. REv. 749, 754-55 (1993).
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advantage by purchasing the requisite amount of mitigation wherever it is least
costly.4
To build a climate change system in which JI is a central element requires
a new set of legal mechanisms which motivate, facilitate, and evaluate the
quality of JI projects. What minimally makes a project a candidate for JI
recognition is a demonstrable showing that invested funds have led to a lower
stream of GHG emissions than would have been released in their absence.
This measurable reduction may then be used to offset emissions from other
emitting activities of the investor so that its net emissions comply with its legal
commitment. JI possibilities may grow out of a wide range of energy,
industrial, agricultural, residential, and transportation projects.'
Although the initial investments in, and political debate about, JI have
focused on expanding forestry reserves and improving silvaculture practices
to sequester GHGs in new biomass stocks, the potential for large-scale JI is far
greater in the energy sector.' JI projects may involve supply side activities
4. See Joaquim Oliveira-Martins et al., Trade and the Effectiveness of Unilateral CO,-Abatement
Policies: Evidence from Green, 19 OECD ECON. STUD. 123 (1992); see also Alan Manne & Richard
Richels, The Berlin Mandate: The Costs of Meeting Post-2000 Targets and Timetables, ENERGY POL'Y
(forthcoming 1996). It is reasonable to believe that the stock of opportunities to reduce GHG emissions at
the least cost per ton will be found in the developing world. Low cost emissions mitigation in the industrial
world will be constrained by low growth, commitment to existing technologies and assets, a mature energy
and transportation infrastructure, and the high costs of retrofitting. In the developing world, by contrast,
rapid growth will open options to install new capital stock with higher efficiency technologies, reform
political practices that have distorted resource allocations, and modify inefficient business practices which
have persisted because they have not been subject to the competitive forces of markets.
5. For examples of different categories of JI projects, see World Business Council for Sustainable
Development: International Business Action on Climate Change, available in
http://www.wbcsd.climatechange.com. Additional information on JI projects can be found through the
Edison Electric Institute International Utility Efficiency Partnerships, available in http://www.ji.org.
6. Development of JI markets have been slow for a variety of reasons.
(1) The private transactional and organizational costs of adjusting to new forms of investment are
substantial and may have collective goods properties. Complementary services to JI investment such
as legal, insurance, and monitoring services are not yet developed. Organizational reform firms may
need to enter new geographic and service markets where JI potential lies. For example, a Japanese
city, which has always been a monopoly supplier of electricity in Osaka, will need to reform its
internal structures and operating procedures to participate in competitive energy supply ventures in
China.
(2) Public transaction costs are initially high as governments experiment with the rules by which
JI projects will be certified as eligible to create valid offsets. Standards for qualified monitoring and
GHG accounting protocols have yet to be fashioned. The process of developing national JI programs
is clouded, but not stalled, by the uncertainty about the future of JI in the FCCC negotiations. See
infra note 18.
(3) National rules that create incentives to invest in Jl projects are yet undeveloped. In industrial
nations, the likely home countries of JI investors, there are no serious taxes or environmental liabilities
against which GHG offsets can be credited. Current JI activity is then motivated by voluntary and
[Vol. 3:295
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which reduce emissions either by changing the inputs to productive processes
or by increasing their efficiency. Examples of supply-side JI activities are
switching fuels from coal to natural gas or improving the capacity of
transmission lines that carry electricity from generators to users. Alternatively,
JI may operate on the demand side through programs like financing consumer
use of compact florescent lighting or the installation of mass transport, which
lower the consumption of emissions-intensive products or services.7
The way nations decide what constitutes a qualified JI project and
determine how many offsets will be credited to a JI investor pose a host of
subtle strategic issues that will excite much analytical commentary and legal
argument. The issues include how to define national emissions baselines
against which Jl-caused improvements are to be measured, how to monitor and
verify that JI projects comply with their promised environmental benefits, and
how to prevent nations from abandoning environmentally sound policies in
order to increase the number of JI opportunities they may market
self-regulation programs, in anticipation of the enactment of limitations on GHG emissions in the
future. In these circumstances, the value of GHG offsets will be uncertain and heavily discounted.
(4) In the Americas, the initial activity in JI has been focused on small scale emissions
sequestration projects. Afforestation and forest conservation programs have been a subject of political
controversy, attacked by developing countries as attempts by the to engage in "carbon colonialism"
and prevent economic growth. Also, since GHG offsets have little positive value at present,
sequestration projects are mismatched to investor needs. Energy firms in the North, the actors most
likely to see JI as an important form of risk management, have few business development opportunities
in the forestry sector to complement the limited offset value as a return on investment. Finally, small
scale projects create higher transaction costs in a market where these costs are already substantial. See
infra note 59. Aggregation of small projects into a more general investment instrument could mitigate
this problem.
(5) JI investment in the more attractive energy sector of Asia is retarded because the energy and
transportation sectors in that region are often caught up in the process of transition. Uncertainties
about subsidies, privatization, and rate setting make financial returns in these key sectors excessively
risky.
(6) The low value of GHG offsets at present creates analytical problems in the process of
certifying JI projects as departures from business as usual. If firms are not sure that a JI project will
be qualified as an offset, they become hesitant to explore the market. See infra notes 8 and 46.
7. See Global Environment Facility, China: Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Control, U.N. Development Programme, U.N. Doe. CPR/91/G32/A/IG/42 (1993) [hereinafter GEF China
Report]; UNITED MEXICAN STATES & BANCO NATIONAL DE OBRAST Y SERVICIOS PUBLICOS, MEXICO: HIGH
EFFICIENCY LIGHTING PILOT PROJECT (Project Document submitted to the World Bank and the Global
Environment Facility, Mar. 1994).
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internationally.' The current problem is not resolving these issues in advance,
but defining specific steps that leading nations ought to take to put this
dynamic game into play.
8. JI projects must contribute to a reduction in global GHG emissions. Baselines define the initial
conditions against which such improvements are to be measured. If all parties to a climate change regime
were assigned caps on their national emissions, these caps would constitute the baseline above which
emissions would be prohibited. In the current situation, where only a limited number of parties have
assumed even soft emissions targets, qualification of offsets implies that JI projects should be additional to
business as usual in order to ensure they are consistent with climate change objectives.
JI projects should be qualified as offsets if investors would not have undertaken the investment in the
absence of the value added by GHG emissions reduction. If the investment would have occurred under a
firm's normal business practice, there is reason to question whether an allowance to offset its emissions in
the home jurisdiction should be permitted. A second aspect of JI accreditation should investigate whether
the nation hosting the project has created, through positive action or inappropriate inaction, an excessive
stock of potential emissions reduction that may be transferred. There is a moral hazard associated with JI
in states without defined emissions allocations since the potential for attracting investment capital may tempt
host governments to abandon local environmental controls, maintain subsidies or trade controls, and relax
pricing reforms in order to market the induced emissions. Bilateral agreements to define a baseline for the
JI host nation, or a unilateral specification of the baseline for the host by the home country as a condition
of JI qualification, can serve as the functional equivalent of a missing national cap.
If national baselines, however defined, were firm, it would not be necessary to worry whether each
individual JI project ensured additionality or the reduction of emissions below some expected trajectory, or
to recognize offsets only when the value of GHG reductions altered a firm's investment portfolio. However,
it will be difficult for host nations to agree to a surrogate baseline that depends on the action of foreign
investors beyond their control. Home nations may choose to define the business as usual case or host
country baseline to include not only an appropriate policy context for environmental quality, but also the
expected patterns of economically justified investment. In this case, JI qualification should rely on a rule
that includes both project additionality and moral hazard considerations in a composite baseline.
JI qualification standards which look to additionality or the investment value of GHG offsets are
problematic in the absence of domestic incentives such as taxes, GHG emission limits, or effective self-
regulation. Until GHG reductions have a positive value, it poses a conundrum for regulators like the United
States Initiative on Joint Implementation or the Japan Program to place too much weight on this condition
for offsets recognition. A moving standard of evaluation that interacts with GHG values may be needed to
develop the JI market. In addition, hard questions about what it means for a project to be a departure from
normal investment patterns intersect with the issue of what constitutes a "no regrets" project. See infra note
46. See also THOMAS C. HELLER, JOINT IMPLEMENTATION AND THE PATH TO A CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME
(The Robert Shuman Centre at European University Institute, Jean Monnet Chair Paper No. 23, 1995);
Naoki Matsuo, Japanese JI Initiative, JoINT IMPLEMENTATION Q., Fall 1995, at 4; Announcement of
Groundrules for U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,442 (1994).
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JI belongs to a family of economic instruments whose optimal form is a
market in tradable emissions permits.9 If there were a clearinghouse for
licenses to emit GHGs, actors producing more emissions than they were
permitted would simply go into this market and buy additional emissions
rights, until the market price of a permit exceeded the costs of reducing further
emissions. As long as the total quantity of authorized emissions, divided
among nations, is consistent with global climate change targets, tradable
permits in deep and efficient international markets would yield environmental
protection and a least-cost result.3 °
JI is usually presented by advocates of economic instruments as a way
station on the road to a comprehensive regime of tradable permits, which
would enable public agencies and private organizations to learn how to operate
in a world of international trade in environmental services. Like any market
which is incomplete and sparsely populated, JI would initially be an imperfect
economic tool." Yet, in spite of its recognized limits, JI sets forth the basic
structure of a new genre of post-regulatory tools, strongly favored by industrial
groups and national political authorities. The proclaimed virtue of these
market instruments is that they foster decentralized decisionmaking through
the use of property allocations, taxes, or subsidies. These market instruments
alter the quantities or prices of goods and services implicated in the solution
of collective action problems, instead of relying on centralized mandates of
specific technologies or production processes as do traditional command and
9. J1 is a type of economic instrument similar in purpose to a tradable permits system. In some
instances, a JI project might involve no more than a purchase of carbon or other GHG offsets unrelated to
the buyer's core business. For example, a North American utility, with no experience or interest in forestry,
could invest in a reforestation program in Malaysia, taking the return on its capital in the form of the GHG
offsets allocated by the investment agreement. In this case, the A1 project would be equivalent to a purchase
of a tradable offset, if such an international instrument existed. It would also be possible for the J1 investor
to combine its return in carbon with a standard financial return, if it so desired. In other instances, J1 may
involve projects that are extensions of the core business of the buyer of the offsets. If the North American
utility were to invest in an Asian project aimed at improving the efficiency of transmission and distribution
lines, its return could be based on the value of the offsets assigned to it, any financial return it took from the
electricity sales, and potential gains in business development from extending its service market into a
growing area of the world. Until political action assigns a higher positive value to reductions of GHG
emissions, the latter form of JI is likely to predominate. See supra note 6.
10. Least cost results do not follow necessarily from permit trading if there is an uneven impact of
emissions. See GER KLAASSEN, TRADE OFF IN EXCHANGE RATE TRADING FOR SULFUR EMISSIONS IN
EUROPE (1993) (report to the UN/ECE Task Force on Economic Aspects of Abatement Strategies). This
is not a problem with CO2 trading due to uniform diffusion.
II. See Peter Bohm, Incomplete International Cooperation to Reduce CO2 Emissions: Alternative
Policies, 24 J. ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 258 (1993); Kerry Krutilla, Environmenal Regulation in an Open
Economy, 20 J. ENvTL. ECON.& MGMT. 127 (1991).
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control regulatory policies."2  Although the standard logic of trade and
the rising tide of domestic deregulation would seem to strengthen the argument
for legitimating JI, this has not happened in the FCCC negotiations in the
aftermath of Rio. JI and the broader issue of appropriate climate change
instruments have been embroiled in a fundamental debate about the issue of
the allocation among FCCC signatories of commitments to reduce GHG
emissions, a debate which has stalled the multilateral negotiations. The
initiative undertaken at Rio reflected a widely shared optimism about the
prospects for attacking problems of a global reach, with negotiations on a
global scale. Against the background of expanding international
environmental law, 3 the FCCC process was inaugurated in the afterglow of the
successful Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.'
Yet the first years of the FCCC regime were marked by an inability to resolve
the core issues of how extensively wealthy nations must cut their GHG
emissions; what commitments, if any, will be assumed by developing nations;
12. The use of the term command and control is often imprecise. Command and control policies
might be defined purely as involving a governmental mandate of environmental process or product
technologies, with location-specific regulation and no trading. See Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates,
Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 675, 685-87 (1992). A pure economic
instrument might suggest pollution permits or environmental taxes that set the quantity or alter the price of
pollution. Economic instruments leave producers and consumers with the choice of how to respond most
efficiently to those changes in economic conditions, and imply the possibility of trading in open markets to
comply with their obligations. It is also possible, however, to define midpoints along this continuum which
combine varying degrees of flexibility and trading. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 7651-7651o (showing the complex mix of mandatory regulation and limited market instruments
that allow permit trading in the United States); see also Paul R. Portney, EPA and the Evolution of Federal
Regulation, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 7 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990).
13. See generally ANTHONY D'AMATO & KiRsTEN ENGEL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ANTHOLOGY (1996); VED P. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY (1995);
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (Robin Churchill & David Freestone eds., 1991).
It is important to recall that the rapid increase in the number of international environmental agreements does
not in itself mean that these laws are enforced. There is reason to question whether the laws are more
formal, symbolic, or aspirational than a material restraint on environmental degradation. For an analysis of
the political economy of international environment regimes, often more optimistic about the prospects for
effective multilateral accord on climate change than is my argument in this essay, see generally GLOBAL
ACCORD: ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES (Nazi Choucri ed., 1993);
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
(Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993); LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING
MORE EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS (1994).
14. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1550 (amended 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537); RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (199 1).
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and who will bear the costs of these mitigation activities." This blockage also
raises questions about whether the underlying political and economic factors
that contributed to the agreement in Montreal are so different that they explain
the obstacles on the road from Rio.16
My argument is that the FCCC process has stumbled over some problems
that are specific to the issue of climate change and others that are peculiar to
15. At the First Conference of the Parties to the FCCC (COP-I), held in Berlin in April 1995,
agreement on a protocol legitimating J was prevented by an unresolved debate between developed and
developing countries on the nature of commitments to limit GHG emissions after the year 2000. Third
World states insisted that the Annex I parties deepen their emissions reductions in the next century because
they were historically the parties responsible for the climate change problem. Industrial states argued that
deeper mitigation commitments would be ineffective without universal commitments because the bulk of
GHG emissions growth would take place in the developing world, especially Asia. Although a number of
less developed states in the Group of 77 (G-77) supported a JI protocol that would allow offsets for qualified
projects, this solution was stalled within the G-77 caucus. The COP-I compromise position was that JI
would be permitted only for the purpose of study in a Pilot Period, and that, during the Pilot Period, the
FCCC would not recognize any positive value for offsets in JI projects between Annex I and developing
states. In effect, the Berlin Mandate was "no cap, no trade." See Mark Hertsgaard, Global Warning, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, at 23. See also infra note 61.
16. The analogy between the Montreal Protocol and the effort to build a comprehensive regime in
the FCCC is attractive. Both ozone depletion and climate change are problems of the global commons,
require a comprehensive solution, and were motivated in good part by scientific consensus in a mobilized
epistemic community. See generally 46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992) (special issue devoted to the role of epistemic
communities in international relations). The Montreal Accords, however, are distinguished by the small
number of nations where ozone depleting substances were manufactured, the absence of a blocking coalition
in the G-77 group because of the low economic interest in CFC consumption, the mass political visibility
of the ozone hole over Antarctica, and the development of a close substitute for CFCs by DuPont. See James
K. Sebenius, Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis
and the Case of Epistemic Communities, 46 INT'L ORG. 323, 355-61 (1992). The availability of a close CFC
substitute was critical for a number of reasons. First, it fragmented business criticism of the scientific
consensus on the causes and consequences of damage to upper level ozone. Second, it reduced to
manageable proportions the costs of creating a transfer fund to compensate developing nations for their
economic losses of subscribing to the regime. Third, it allowed the United States to become a strong regime
advocate, backed by DuPont, marshaling incentives and sanctions on behalf of regime formation. In the case
of climate change, there are large numbers of self-interested parties, a formidable blocking coalition of
southern states facing high opportunity costs of emissions stabilization, little agreement on the availability
of low cost options for GHG mitigation that suggest compensation is practical, and little public anxiety about
the long run harms threatened by climate change.
A general discussion about the competing theories in international relations that stress realpolitik,
institutional factors, or the roles of epistemic communities in environmental regimes is beyond the scope
of this paper. See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185 (1982); Detlef Sprinz & Tapani Vaahtoranta, The Interest-Based
Explanation of International Environmental Policy, 48 INT'L ORG. 77 (1994). 1 will note that to the extent
that the exercise of power, by inducement or sanction, is important to regime formation, it may be necessary
to build regimes in forums where such power can be effectively deployed. Because the United Nations
process of multilateral negotiations increases the potential for the formation of blocking coalitions, it may
not be as apt a forum for climate change as more decentralized or multi-local bargaining. In this sense,
Montreal may encourage a misplaced confidence about the prospects for mitigation of climate change
through the FCCC.
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the UN multilateral forum in which climate change is being addressed. My
theory why deadlock has emerged, and is likely to persist, can be outlined in
five points:
(1) A nation may adopt two possible strategies to respond to climate
change-mitigation and/or adaptation. The purpose of the former is to
reduce the causal factors of change in the climatic system. The purpose
of the latter is to restructure social and economic organization to adjust to
the damages brought about by an altered climate.
(2) Mitigation is a solution whose effectiveness depends upon the
common action of many nations and requires an institutional regime to
ensure this necessary international cooperation. Adaptation is a local
solution which will can be adopted either by national choice or in default
of a common regime.
(3) To build a common institutional regime for mitigation demands the
resolution of three problems specific to the issue of climate change:
(a) A number of nations, sufficiently large to make a common
mitigation regime effective, must reveal their actual willingness to
pay, or their actual demand to be paid so that negotiators may find a
basis for a comprehensive regime. Scientific and economic
uncertainty about the risks of climate change and strategic behavior in
negotiations will obscure the discovery of a solution point (which
would be reflected in the determination of a global limit on GHG
emissions and an allocation of this cap among regime participants),
especially given the differences among nations in the relative costs of
mitigation and adaptation.
(b) A mitigation regime must include a mechanism for trade in
capped emission rights (or an analogous international market in tax
credits) among participants; in other words, a cap and trade system.
In the absence of trade, the costs of domestic mitigation will be too
high for nations that still rely on extensive and efficient fossil fuel
energy systems. Accordingly, they may defect to adaptation
strategies. JI is one mechanism for implementing a cap and trade
system. Such economic instruments, however, may have implications
[Vol. 3:295
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for the volume of transfer payments in a climate change regime that
will be resisted by developing nations.
(c) A mitigation regime will probably have to be built within a
limited time period before new emission-intensive energy and
transportation infrastructures are established in rapidly developing
economies. The installation of a capital base, with a long useful life,
may bring about enough climate change so that adaptation becomes
a dominant strategy in nations with relatively low costs of adaptation.
(4) For a variety of institutional reasons, it may be that the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change is not an appropriate venue in
which the problems of a climate change regime, which mandates broad
commitment by both developing and developed nations, are likely to be
solved.
(5) If the FCCC is not the best venue to agree on a mitigation regime,
mitigation proponents must seek a forum more likely to allow the
emergence of a solution that incorporates the necessary elements of value
revelation, trade, and timeliness. JI can be reconceived as the cornerstone
of an alternative, multi-local system where trading is the mechanism by
which caps-national allocations of emissions quotas-are discovered
through the operations of the market cap and trade system.
My ultimate goal here is to provide an understanding of why the political
economy of climate change has proven so difficult and to speculate on the
prospects for escaping from the current deadlock over commitments through
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the multilateral diplomatic process. 7 Because I am skeptical about these
prospects, my sense is that, as a tactical matter, it will be necessary to
reconsider the concept of JI from a less orthodox perspective. This paper
attempts to show that because the direct, multilateral road to a comprehensive
climate change regime is impeded, JI can provide a roundabout route to that
same endpoint. Put bluntly, JI-understood as a surrogate for tradable permits
--is blocked because it is assumed that the allocation of GHG emission quotas
must precede trading within those caps. Since the commitments issue is
unresolved in the FCCC, JI, as a trade mechanism, is inhibited.
Yet, in spite, and because of this political blockage, JI remains the one
active field where market instruments for climate change are being explored.
Though not fully validated by the FCCC, JI is the only game in play and, if
reconceived, may provide an escape path from the deadlock over commitments
17. The COP-I debate reflected the constitutional and cultural character of the multilateral
negotiating forum. Voting rules are based on consensus and make likely the formation of blocking
coalitions. In addition, the diplomatic dialogue about climate change is often embedded in a wider heuristic
by which North and South argue over who is responsible for causing and ameliorating global difficulties.
The G-77 bloc has taken the position that JI or other forms of international trading are unacceptable because
they are not consistent with the equities of global environmental politics. They argue that JI would
constitute an evasion of historical responsibilities in the North, that emissions must be eliminated at home,
and that no limits may be imposed on compensatory economic growth in the South. While research points
out that, because of population and energy use dynamics, the total cumulated past emissions of industrial
nations are not very different from the prospective emissions in the developing world, the debate over
climate change cannot easily be separated from a much broader diplomatic agenda in which North-South
discord is endemic. See Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens, Equity Aspects of the Marketable Permits Approach
to Global Warming Policy 15-16 (Nov. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Wherever one's political sympathies lie in this global debate, the enmeshing of JI within it hinders a
more pragmatic understanding of the JI problem. Because the costs of retrofitting existing energy and
transportation infrastructure to lower emissions may be a very high percentage of total replacement costs,
Annex I nations which rely heavily on fossil fuels are unlikely to reduce emissions substantially before the
present capital base is largely depreciated. Because much of this base was installed in recent decades,
infrastructure in the North is often at a midpoint of its normal forty to fifty year life cycle. Consequently,
the present costs of deep mitigation below current emissions levels in Annex I nations may be high relative
to the costs of adapting to climate change. Alternatively, infrastructure installation in much of Asia, where
the large growth in emissions is forecast, is at the beginning of an investment cycle. If JI can be used, in
part, to push new Asian energy and transport systems toward the leading edge of emissions mitigation, it
may be possible to reduce the risks of climate change during the coming years when the northern capital
base is obsolescing. The next major round of investment in Annex I nations should be far more carbon
neutral because of technology innovation. The JI problem, as realpolitik, is to deal with the current, limited
dilemma by creating foreign investment flows into the South where the mitigation opportunities exist. See
infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text on the implications of this timing question for regime formation.
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in the multilateral negotiations."5 If we reimagine JI as an active market, in
which nations bid to attract foreign investment in environmentally sound
projects, it may be possible to induce them to take on mitigation commitments
individually through individual bargains. In other words, an operative JI
market would become less the implementing instrument of the climate change
regime than the means by which it is constituted.
Although this introductory essay only focuses on propositions one through
three above, I will close with a sketch of my argument, which asserts the
importance of contemplating a period during which the development of a
comprehensive regime can only be approached through the careful exercise of
environmental realpolitik. This is because of the low probability that
multilateral diplomacy will break free of the political deadlock in which it is
enmeshed (proposition four). Specifically, JI must become the instrument by
which a limited number of willing nations inaugurate a cap and trade system
as the centerpiece of an alternate road to climate change--a road which can
detour around stalled diplomatic politics (proposition five).
A detailed discussion of possible operative rules and institutions under
which a multi-local system may evolve toward an effective and comprehensive
regime is beyond the scope of this article. At this point, my purpose is to
persuade the interested community that the current problem is not what the
optimal substance of a climate change regime should be, but in which forum
18. My thesis is that the development of JI markets should proceed in less centralized forums outside
the FCCC to escape two problems engendered by multilateral negotiations. The first is the easy coalition
of blocking groups due to large numbers and the international law norm that seeks consensus among
autonomous nation-state actors. See James K. Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting
Issues and Parties, 37 INT'L ORG. 281 (1983). The second is the political interest in bargaining in the
climate change arena to establish reputation effects that are aimed at other issues on the broad diplomatic
agenda. In less centralized forums, the capacity of nations to mobilize incentives and sanctions will differ,
as will their ability to monitor compliance. A dynamic game that converges toward a common regime for
climate change may begin with a limited number of players, although a relatively early credible commitment
to participate by the United States and China, as the largest emitters whose behavior will be emulated by
others, seems essential for success.
In this perspective, the failure at the Conference of the Parties in Berlin to agree on a protocol
authorizing the international recognition of JI offsets is not debilitating. Businesses who may invest in JI
projects care not about FCCC recognition, but whether their national governments agree that the firms have
met whatever obligations those governments have devolved to them.
National recognition for JI offsets may be initiated in either of two ways. A key subset of wealthy,
GHG emitter nations may coordinate a multi-local cap and trade system outside the FCCC, or they may sign
among themselves a limited protocol within the FCCC forum that depends on the consent of the whole G-77
bloc. In either case, they would agree to certify offsets to their national investors in qualified JI projects and
extract the JI question from the unresolved issues of commitments. The success of the project would depend
on the ability of the market thus created to attract non-signatories to trade environmental quality for
investment capital. See infra note 61.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
and by what process this issue should be addressed. Further, I submit that my
contrarian argument-that international relations may sometimes better proceed
through indirection than along more straightforward pathways-should be
seriously considered.
I. THE CONDITIONS OF NEGOTIATION: APPROACHING THE CHINA TRAP
Climate change is not a replay of the story of "Chicken Little," who spread
the news of impending catastrophe across the barnyard when an acorn fell
upon his head. The sky will not fall if projected warming occurs, even at the
upper end of the forcasted 1.5 to 5 degrees Celsius range of temperature
increases. 9 Four degrees centigrade is about the average annual temperature
difference between New York and Miami, and people survive in both places.
There are two fundamental problems with climate change: first, the disparate
impact of warming and its associated climatic effects in various regions of the
globe; and second, the disparate capacity of the varied social systems in those
regions to adapt to those climatic effects.
It is highly probable that there will be important differences in the relative
cost of mitigating climate change as opposed to adapting to life in a warmer
environment. This variability in the relative local costs of mitigation and
adaptation may alter the incentives of nations to choose which of these two
strategies should be dominant. Calculating the mitigation costs of installing
and operating emissions-reducing technologies, of lowering the rate of
economic growth, and, for wealthier nations, of contributing transfer payments
to the international regime may be problematic." However, estimates of
adaptation costs may be at least as hazardous. Beyond the direct costs that a
19. See David Schimel et al., CO., and the Carbon Cycle, in CLIMATE CHANGE 1994: RADIATIVE
FORCING OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND AN EVALUATION OF THE IPCC 1S92 EMISSION SCENARIOS 35 (J.T.
Houghton et al. eds., 1995); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SECOND
ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS OF SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL INFORMATION RELEVANT TO INTERPRETING ARTICLE
2 OF THE UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 2-4,
14-17, on file with the IPCC Working Group II Technical Support Unit, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter
IPCC SYNTHESIS].
20. See generally WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING (1992) (especially chs.
3-5); Andrew Dean & Peter Hoeller, Costs of Reducing CO, Emissions: Evidence from Six Global Models,
19 OECD ECON. STUD. 15 (1992); W. DAVID MONTGOMERY, CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, INC., THE COST
OF CONTROLLING CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS: CONSENSUS AND CONTRAST IN ECONOMIC MODELS (1992)
(final report prepared for the American Petroleum Institute). For IPCC criteria for evaluation of costs and
benefits associated with climate change, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC
WORKING GROUP III SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5-11 (1995).
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nation, confronted with a changing climate, may incur in protecting itself
against threatened damages or the loss of valued ecologies, there also may be
substantial indirect adaptation costs.2 These may result from the spillover
effects of regionally variable damages, caused by warming, that are reflected
in certain social phenomena like conflicts over scarce environmental resources
or population displacements." Finally, there is at least the possibility that
investments in mitigation and adaptation strategies are not complementary but
exclusive and that nations may see the choice between them as all or nothing. 2
Unless these nations are persuaded that mitigation can be cost-effective, they
will opt for adaptation and undercut the feasibility of a multilateral regime.
Although the relative cost comparisons between mitigation and adaptation-
based strategies may be hard to determine, the qualitative distinction between
them is sharp. Mitigation is a pure public good for any target level of
emissions reduction since it does not matter where mitigation occurs.
Therefore, the usual collective action problems associated with public goods
demand that strategies aimed at mitigation create institutions able to coordinate
and monitor a cooperative regime. Adaptation, by contrast, is local in
character and requires no commitment to common solutions. Each nation need
only pursue its own least costly options for adjusting to its prospective
damages.
The greatest risk in negotiating a mitigation regime may lie with
asymmetrical information, about the location of the thresholds of adaptation
costs, which lead developing nations to underestimate the willingness of the
wealthy to pursue local solutions, rather than pay the price the South demands
to participate in a common system.u While the impacts and costs of response
to climate change may be locally specific,25 it is very plausible that the bulk of
the damages, to which affordable adaptation is limited, will occur in Third
21. For a discussion of mitigation costs, see IPCC SYNTHESIS, supra note 19, at 17-22;
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC WORKING GROUP II, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION OPTIONS 11-18 (1995) [hereinafter IPCC
OPTIONS]. For a discussion of direct adaptation costs, see IPCC SYNTHESIS, supra note 19, at 7-11, 24;
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES
at xliii-xlvi (1991) [hereinafter IPCC RESPONSE]. See also U.S. CLIMATE ACnON REPORT, supra note 2,
109-32; Paul E. Waggoner, Now, Think of Adaptation, 9 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 137; A. Dan Tarlock,
Now, Think Again About Adaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 169; Jesse H. Ausubel, A Second Look at
the Impacts of Climate Change, 79 AM. SCi. 210 (1991). See CLINE, supra note 20, at 295-96.
22. See infra note 60.
23. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
25. See Robert Mendelsohn et al., The Impact of Global Warming on Agriculture: A Ricardian
Analysis, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 753 (1994).
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World nations.' This would imply that the relative value of mitigation is
higher for developing states than for the industrialized bloc. It might also
imply that the point at which adaptation supplants mitigation as the dominant
climate change strategy will be lower in the North than the South.
Mitigation is a public good, which requires that a sufficient number of
nations cooperate to yield a common mitigation solution. Demands by the
South that the North pay a total cost in domestic emissions reductions, plus
international transfers, which exceed their adaptation costs, may cause
northern nations to defect from the climate change regime. Powerful northern
actors such as the United States or the European Union are not easily subjected
to sanctions if they refuse to subscribe to an international regime.
Accordingly, any defection by a strong northern actor will radically increase
the burden of transfers to be shared by those wealthy states that might
otherwise subscribe. In turn, this burden increase will feed back on the tipping
point or adaptation thresholds of those states otherwise disposed to
commitment. This can lead to a spiral of defections that will end in universal
default.
The political difficulty for a nation faced with a choice between
commitment to a common mitigation regime or default into investment in
adaptation stems from three sources. First, the success of a multiparty
agreement between nations, with diverse environmental values and different
histories of GHG emission, depends on the ability of negotiators to evaluate
accurately the willingness of parties to pay for or supply mitigation services.
Potential solution points for an international regime are clouded, however, by
the political ambiguity that surrounds an issue characterized by substantial
scientific uncertainty.
Climate change is afflicted by a lack of clarity about the probabilities of
temperature increases, the valuation and distribution of their associated
damages, and the relative costs of alternative strategies, such as mitigation or
26. See AS CLIMATE CHANGES: INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS (Kenneth E. Strzepek
& Joel B. Smith eds., 1995) (especially executive summary and chapters on complex river basins, global sea
level rise, and integrated impacts on Egypt); see also GEF China Report, supra note 7, at 10-15. Left out
of most studies would be regional impacts of indirect effects of climate change. For example, if climate
change damage to agricultural productivity, combined with growing populations, the loss of prime
agricultural lands to urbanization, and dietary shifts toward meat consumption that accompany rising wealth
led to substantial grain imports in China, the impact on world agricultural stocks and prices would very
likely be most severe in Africa and other Third World poor states unable to bid effectively in global
agricultural markets. See VACLAV SMIL, CHINA'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LIMITS
OFNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 138-87 (1993).
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adaptation. Although there is a substantial consensus among atmospheric
scientists about the overall direction and range of probable effects on the
climate from greenhouse gas emissions, debate about the interaction between
the biosphere and the geosphere, and about the local and regional effects of
systemic change will continue. 7 The economic logic of risk management
would support some form of current international action as insurance against
the more extreme consequences of climate change. However, political actors
always resist imposing sure and immediate costs on identifiable voting
interests in order to secure long-term and less certain gains for diffuse, often
unborn, beneficiaries. This reluctance, when combined with the wide variation
of values attached to climate change risks and the strategic incentives to mask
actual values, inhibits multilateral agreement upon a common regime.
Second, the timing of the constitution of a climate change regime is not
propitious. The Earth Summit coincided with a widespread, often justified,
disenchantment in the domestic politics of many nations in both the industrial
and developing world with the orthodox instruments of government regulation,
including the regulation of the environment. The struggle over climate change
has been marked by a demand for two simultaneous innovations in the
standard practices of international regimes: new commitments and new
instruments. Making one substantial change in political direction is always
hard; two changes often spawn coalitions of interests, which have different
reasons for opposition that are impossible to overcome.
The third source of political difficulty of nations forced to choose between
mitigation or adaptation is time constraints in the early stages of regime
definition which may lead to irreversible or path-dependent effects on later
options; deferred action becomes the choice by default. The combined effect
of these independent sources of political debility makes the resolution of the
climate change problem, by means of internationally coordinated mitigation,
problematic.
27. For the IPCC consensus, see IPCC SYNTHESIS, supra note 19. For views that dissent from the
IPCC consensus, see Patrick J. Michaels & David E. Stooksbury, The Failure of the Popular Vision of
Global Warming, 9 AIUZ. J. COMP. & INT'L L. 53.
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II. VALUE REVELATION: UNCERTAINTY AND THE PRICE OF MITIGATION
The attempt to decide national policy positions on climate change remains
a contested subject for all major signatories of the FCCC, especially in those
advanced and developing countries that depend on fossil fuels. The
uncertainties clouding these debates derive from the compounded effects of
near speculative predictions about a linked cycle of scientific and economic
processes. To estimate GHG emissions trajectories, one begins with forecasts
of demographic and economic growth, placing emphasis on urbanization and
energy use rates. Growth indicators can be translated into net emissions output
through more specific variables, such as sectoral shifts from agriculture and
industry to services, qualitative evolution of diet from grains to meat, the
evolution of transport and land use patterns, and the projected composition of
fuels consumed in energy generation. Net emissions factor into climate
impacts through complex global atmospheric models. These models require
a careful definition of the interactions of the atmosphere and the biological and
oceanographic systems that function as sinks for greenhouse gasses. 8
The recent work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) is testimony to the rapid advances in modelling competence and to the
distance still to be covered.29 The latest sets of global simulation results,
corrected for the cooling effects caused by the eruption of Mount Pinotubo and
the emission of sulphate aerosols from fossil fuel burning, track empirical
records on temperature directions and magnitudes increasingly well. However,
because national strategies toward climate change are determined by local and
regional impacts of climate variation, the formidable task of reducing effective
scale bf climate models to conform to political scale still lies ahead of the
scientific community. 3
0
28. See David S. Schimel, Terrestrial Ecosystems and the Carbon Cycle, I GLOBAL CHANGE
BIOLOGY 77 (1995); David Schimel & Elizabeth Sulzman, Variability in the Earth Climate System: Decadal
and Longer Timescales, 33 REvIEws OF GEOPHYSICS 873 (Supp. 1995); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY & ASSESSMENT, CLIMATE TREATIES AND MODELS: ISSUES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
MANAGEMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (1994).
29. See IPCC SYNTHESIS, supra note 19, at 5-6; Elizabeth W. Sulzman et al., Modeling Human-
Induced Climatic Change: A Summary for Environmental Managers, 19 ENVTL. MGMT. 197 (1995).
30. See, e.g., THE RAINS MODEL OF ACIDIFICATION: SCIENCE AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE (Joseph
Alcamo et al. eds., 1990); Leen Hordijk, Use of the RAINS Model in Acid Rain Negotiations in Europe, 25
ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 596 (1991); Gregory R. Carmichael & Richard L. Arndt, Atoms Module: Long Range
Transport and Deposition of Sulfur in Asia, in RAINS-ASIA: AN ASSESSMENT MODEL FOR AIR POLLUTION
IN ASIA at V-I (Wes Foell et al. eds., 1995); see also Sulzman et al., supra note 29, at 203-05.
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If policymakers had reasonable confidence in the growth-emissions-
climate nexus, their next step in planning a climate change strategy would be
to relate climate forecasts to economic costs and benefits. The principal
interactions usually identified are connected to agriculture (net CO2
fertilization, rainfall shifts, frost days), sea level changes, human health (heat
related illness, spread of tropical disease vectors), hyper-storm and other high
climate variance events, biodiversity loss, disruption of particular ecologies
such as wetlands and deltas, and feedback effects on energy demand." The
economic costs of climate change would vary widely depending on local
exposure to these multiple risks, with some nations experiencing net positive
benefits that would make them reluctant adherents to a mitigation regime.12 In
some instances, regional climatic factors may affect the damages associated
with global phenomena. For example, while the national assessment of sea
level changes will depend on the proportions of the population and on
economic activity in low-lying areas, the local health costs of warming could
be reduced by the countervailing effects of regional aerosol concentrations not
subject to long-range transport.
The ordinal relation between adaptation and mitigation strategies is a
crucial question in the negotiation of a climate change regime. The point at
which it becomes cheaper to adapt than to mitigate is the ceiling to what
wealthy nations--expected to reduce their historic rates of emission and pay
compensation for cooperative action by developing states--are willing to pay
for a common solution. Yet, pervasive uncertainty about the reliability of
growth-emissions-climate models obscures the cardinal values attached to
these alternatives. As noted above, the cost of adaptation may hinge on
variables as hard to estimate as the value of losses in biodiversity or the
marginal cost of increased border and police vigilance against illegal
migration, due to environmental damages. There are, however, equally
complex political and conceptual problems associated with working out the
economics of mitigation.
First, recent studies have indicated that costs can be driven down deeply
by global trade in mitigation services." Whether trading will be incorporated
and implemented efficiently in the FCCC regime is now a matter of political
speculation."' Second, technological optimism or suspicion, each a recurring
31. See IPCC OPTnONS, supra note 21, at 4-11.
32. See Mendelsohn et al., supra note 25.
33. See sources cited supra note 4.
34. See infra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
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theme of modem history, can affect attitudes about the viability of a mitigation
strategy.35 Developments in technologies which reduce or avoid emissions
may lower the slope of projected cost curves for mitigation if they can be
substituted for current processes in time to limit irreversible damages.
However, past predictions about the rate of cost-effective technological change
in the energy sector for alternative fuels like solar, fusion, or biomass have
been notoriously unreliable. Governments may now attach scant credibility
to claims that they ought to invest heavily in mitigation, rather than pursue
adaptation, while awaiting expected technical breakthroughs. 6
A third source of uncertainty about the translation of scientific and
economic data into policy arises from the interdependence between actors that
characterizes collective action problems. Since mitigation is a joint product,
the decisions of any one nation to commit to a mitigation regime must rest on
its expectations about the complementary behavior of other states. If national
actors believe that key prospective regime partners either cannot commit to
mitigation or will not be able to enforce and implement the obligations they
undertake, the resulting expectations that the system will be ineffective in
forestalling climate change will cause them to retreat toward local adaptation.
Earlier, I noted the fragile politics of commitments to mitigation, which
require national authorities to balance current expenditures against future
benefits. Political constitutions and voting systems vary widely in the
incentives and disincentives which affect decision makers' responses to short-
run or longer-term interests. If a nation expects that its partners in a collective
effort, like mitigation, have short time horizons that will lead them to favor a
regime which loads mitigation costs into the period just beyond the next
national election or change in administration, they may have small reason to
believe the next generation of politicians will have incentives to comply with
commitments entered into by their predecessors. In such a game, defections
from mitigation will become attractive.
Similarly, states may have varied capabilities to implement mitigation
commitments. Nations such as the United States, with a strong tradition of
popular democracy and large numbers of domestic actors, whose behavior
must be coordinated, may be adjudged less reliable collective-action partners
than Western European or East Asian polities, with an established tradition of
35. See generally HOWARD P. SEGAL, TECHNOLOGICAL UTOPIANISM IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1985).
36. Technological innovations which are said to reduce simultaneously economic and environmental
costs are discussed in conjunction with the wider debate about "no regrets" options. See infra notes 40-47
and accompanying text.
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corporatist politics." These states may be better able to enter into and police
climate commitments because they can agree on the appropriate division of
obligations among, and monitor the behavior of, small numbers of
oligopolistic firms grouped by sectors in intermediary organizations.
Alternative queries about the will and ability to adhere to multilateral
agreements may obscure forecasts about the behavior of Third World states
like China, whose participation is essential for successful mitigation. Nations
in transition from authoritarian politics and centrally planned economies can
reacquire legitimacy by achieving high economic growth rates that supply the
basic needs of expanding populations.38 At the same time, these nations labor
under the questionable effectiveness of nascent legal institutions needed to
assure compliance with collective commitments.39 Again, since the value of
mitigation expenditures depends on the coordinated activity of regime
partners, an absence of their credible commitment to, or capacity for
compliance with, mitigation regime obligations will push policy makers in
states with relatively low adaptation costs toward the local solutions they can
better manage.
A final argument on behalf of a mitigation regime, that may bear greater
political weight, asserts that mitigation is a "no regrets" strategy. The concept
of no regrets suggests that there is an extensive portfolio of GHG emissions-
reducing options, in production and consumption, unexploited by normal
market operations, which can be installed and operated at no net cost to their
37. On the political effects of differences in institutional culture within the European Union, see
Susana Aguilar, Corporatist and Statist Designs in Environmental Policy: The Contrasting Roles of
Germany and Spain in the European Union Scenario, 2 ENVT,. POL. 223 (1993); Adrienne Heritier,
"Leaders" and "Laggards" in European Clean Air Policy, in CONVERGENCE OR DIVERsrrY?.
INTERNATIONALIZATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSE (Brigitte Unger & Frans van Waarden eds.,
1995).
38. See WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY 157-67
(1993).
39. See Stanley B. Lubman & Gregory C. Wajnowski, International Commercial Dispute Resolution
in China: A Practical Assessment, 4 AM. REV. OF INT'L ARB. 107 (1993).
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users.4" The idea of a no regrets option could be meaningful in both a social
and a private context. In a collective sense, no regrets could signal that total
societal wealth could be increased while emissions fall, with a consequent
improvement in public welfare. For example, if current subsidies to fossil
fuels were reduced so that the use of lower emissions energy sources were
increased, standard economics would call that a no regrets result.4
This would not mean that all parties involved in this substitution would be
happy about the situation. Fossil fuel users and producers could find their
wealth reduced. However, the gains to taxpayers who had financed the
subsidy, to consumers who had suffered the deadweight loss of the subsidy-
induced resource misallocation, and to those who value the reduced
environmental damages should more than offset these losses. Since, in theory,
compensation to the losing groups is possible, and since legal economic
analysis does not accord a protected right or reliance interest in subsidies, the
restoration of appropriate prices in the market causes neither compensable
harm nor regret.
The meaning of "no regrets" becomes more complicated as soon as we
acknowledge that the policies in place have been enacted, and will be
defended, by entrenched political forces. Real transactional costs of political
mobilization are associated with displacing embedded policies. Moreover, the
lack of legal recognition of reliance interests alters the forum where the battle
occurs, more than it alters the intensity of the fight.
40. The logic underlying the "no regrets" argument suggests that either society as a whole or a
private organization can alter its behavior so that environmental quality and wealth will both increase. If
a stock of no regrets solutions exists, the policy problem is to find out what hinders their discovery and
remove the bottleneck. Most no regrets examples seem to turn on three types of bottleneck. First,
organizational problems may prevent actors from seeing or implementing no regrets solutions. In public
organizations, the problem may be political capture that leads to inefficient subsidies. In private firms, it
may be having janitorial staffs with no incentives to install efficient lighting in charge of maintenance
decisions. A second cause of no regrets bottlenecks are information costs. For example, firms may be
unaware because of cognitive limitations or routines that are used to scan investment possibilities that further
R&D investment will yield substitutes for environmentally damaging products or processes and a market
return on their investment. If forced to make this investment, resistance will evaporate once the bottleneck
is broken. Third, imperfect capital markets may impede investment in activities which are known to be
efficient in the medium or long run. Admitting the possibility of global welfare gains at the societal or
organizational level, no regrets options present, but do not solve, the problems of how high the costs of
removing bottlenecks are, who will pay them, and whether and how social or intra-organizational interests
whose welfare may decline in order to win the global benefit will be compensated.
41. The reduction of energy subsidies, without more, would make a substantial contribution to GHG
mitigation. See Jean-Marc Burniaux et al., The Effect of Existing Distortions in Energy Markets on the Costs
of Policies to Reduce CO 2 Emissions: Evidence from Green, 19 ORGANISATION ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV. 141 (1992).
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The number of "no regrets" options in the private sector is still more
elusive. We might note that firms have not installed efficient insulation
systems and consumers have not made use of low energy lighting, even though
it is clear that these technologies would be cheaper and less GHG emissions-
intensive than their present practices." It is often asserted that firms do not
invest appropriately in new technologies or in the development of products
that yield a competitive rate of return and are ecologically more efficient. If
this behavior is attributable to a lack of information about these opportunities,
or to imperfections in capital markets that might hinder front-end heavy
investments, then the meaning of the term "no regrets," where there are
positive costs of information search or financial reform, is problematic.
The Porter hypothesis suggests that firms systematically underestimate the
private marginal rate of substitution between technology innovation and other
investments.43 Therefore, they fail to exploit profit opportunities that would
offset the environmental costs associated with these processes or products.
This argument has been popular among Green groups opposed to the
incorporation of economic instruments and international trading in the FCCC.
These groups favor more orthodox national regulation through mandated
42. See OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE CLIMATE
Is RIGHT FOR ACTION: VOLUNTARY PRoGRAMs To REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMIsSIONS (1992).
43. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETmiiVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 648-49 (1990); see also
Michael E. Porter, America's Green Strategy, 264 Sc. AM. 168 (1991).
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standards or processes, because such regulation will force firms to discover
these negative cost solutions to climate change."
In spite of the allure of the "no regrets" analysis for mitigation proponents,
there are a variety of reasons why the concept may not alleviate the pervasive
uncertainties about climate change that push nations toward default into
adaptation. First, orthodox economists will always be skeptical about the
likelihood that firms in competitive markets will actually make such mistakes
about the relative value of investment in innovation."
Second, when we take into account the transaction costs of reorganizing
information and capital markets, or reforming political errors like subsidies
and protection, it becomes apparent that the term "no regrets" may have scant
operative meaning beyond its technical economic sense. While pure models
in neo-classical economics may have long abstracted from this class of costs,
to businessmen and politicians, transaction costs are indistinguishable from
other costs. To an industrialist being asked to change long-standing behavior
related to the products, processes, markets, or organizational forms in which
he invests, information about options or lobbying to prevent reform are simply
44. See CLIMATE NETWORK EUROPE, JOINT IMPLEMENTATION FROM A EUROPEAN NGO PERSPECTIVE
7-10 (1994). Because of the increasing importance in the multilateral process of the parallel NGO forums
that now complement UN conferences on women, population, and environment, the opposition of Green
groups to economic instruments may be magnified in the FCCC forum. The odd coalition, which opposed
JI at COP-I, was composed of Greens, the oil producing states, and the more confrontational developing
states.
It is ironic that relatively more militant Green groups, who often advocate environmentalism as the best
way to an anti-materialist style of life, rely on technological optimism to decry the need for offset trading.
In part, the Green view that there is a large reserve of no regrets solutions to be discovered may reflect a
residue of left anti-capitalism that sees the private economy as inefficient, and even likely to engage in
conspiracies to forestall eco-efficient innovation. In another vein, Green reluctance to favor economic
instruments and open J1 markets may be rooted in a distrust of the political processes that would oversee
GHG offset trading. In developing nations, where JI projects would be located, the lure of investment funds
may lead to both moral hazard threats to domestic environmental controls and the marketing of poor quality
or badly monitored J opportunities. In developed nations, a race to the bottom may arise in which JI offsets
are recognized by national authorities that do not represent additional environmental quality as much as they
lower the costs for national firms of complying with GHG obligations. The political debilities of
governments in host and home countries, as well as the need for coordination between host states to avoid
competitive dynamics, are real problems for J1. See infra note 59. Many of these questions, however, are
not specific to JI or other economic instruments alone. If politics in the South or the North are captive to
corporate interests, banning economic instruments and markets in favor of national command and control
regulation would not seem the appropriate palliative..
45. If a divergence between the social rate of return to innovation and the private rate of return exists,
then there is scope for policy intervention on standard classical grounds.
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costs of doing business. Policy that ignores these costs may be both
ineffective and resisted. '
Third, if we believe that the allocative failures exposed by no regrets
options represent collective goods problems to be solved through government
action, it is not clear that either climate change, or other environmental
regulation, is the right instrument to be used. For example, if capital markets
were systematically unable to finance cost effective consumer purchases,
economists would argue that it is better to correct the market failure by
46. The existence of "no regrets" options poses conceptual issues for the qualification of JI offsets.
In theory, a no regrets project should be undertaken by a rational and informed public or private actor. For
private JI investments, no regrets projects should have an internal rate of return at or above the market (or
hurdle) rate and should occur in the absence of any additional return derived from the value of GHG offsets.
Since JI qualification might be conditioned on the change in expected investor behavior induced by offset
values, a no regrets project could be rejected by national authorities of the investor's home nation on the
grounds that it should have occurred through normal business practice. No regrets projects could be said
to be inframarginal to the host country baseline (assigned by the home country in the JI process) because
the host country should have reached the post-project level of emissions mitigation without any need for
added J stimulation. See discussion supra note 8.
There are two problems with this policy. First, at present, the positive value of GHG offsets is heavily
discounted. Consequently, investors will se*k out no regrets projects because of their competitive financial
and business development returns. For this reason, they will make up a disproportionate share of the early
JI universe and will call for special attention. Second, the most notable fact about no regrets options is that,
in spite of their purportedly competitive rates of return, some bottleneck prevents their realization. See supra
note 40. In a sense, it seems insufficient to deny offsets, without more, to projects that should have occurred,
when they do not.
One way beyond this puzzle is to focus more carefully on the nature of the bottlenecks that underlie
the no regrets question. If a host nation has created the bottleneck (e.g. a subsidy or an inefficient capital
markets regulation), or should be charged with its removal (e.g. supplying information that has a public
goods character about market opportunities), then it would be logical to include these expectations about
host country policy in the national baseline and deny JI qualification. On the other hand, the bottleneck
might exist because of public goods the host nation is not expected to supply or because of cognitive or
organizational structures at the level of the firm. In this case, it might make sense to grant offset recognition
to provide incentives for investors to break free from the routines that have limited their business as usual
behavior.
JI qualification of no regrets projects with cognitive or organizational bottlenecks might involve an
evolving standard for a given firm or industrial sector. Consider a Japanese utility, historically a monopoly
provider of electricity in a regulated geographic area, which has never been an active exporter of energy
services in the international market. It would require a substantial investment in learning and organizational
reform for the utility to pursue energy provision in China. The costs of learning and restructuring, associated
with a new service in an unfamiliar and risky market, are capital investments to be paid at the outset of the
innovative line of activity. Offset credits may help move the firm from one path of organization
develdpment to another. Once so moved, no further incentives to continue along the new path will be
necessary or appropriate. According to this reasoning, offset recognition of no regrets projects should focus
on the analysis of the transaction costs of going beyond routinized business practice. It would define
business as usual, less on orthodox marginalist assumptions, than on the non-linear principles now being
explored by evolutionary economics. See generally RIcHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN
EVOLUTONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982); Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary Theorizing
About Economic Change, 33 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 48 (1995).
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intervening in the organization of banking directly, than by intervening
through a program of demand side management emissions offsets.47
Finally, it is not intuitive that pervasive market failures, which lead to the
underdevelopment of new technologies, necessarily would mean that there are
more of such failures associated with mitigation than with adaptation
technologies. Even if no regrets opportunities in the private sector are
plentiful and militate in favor of mitigation, this should not mean that no
regrets ought to be a weapon against international emissions trading. As with
other market failures, the probability of substantial misallocations is greater in
the Third World, where markets have long been less competitive than they
have been in advanced industrial nations. If no regrets options exist, they are
more likely to be found in the South than in the North. Trading in emissions
offsets to break through the information and other barriers that prevent their
exploration in the normal course of business, should not be ruled out a priori.
In sum, uncertainties about the thresholds at which various nations will
decide that their costs of mitigation exceed their local costs of adaptation make
estimates of the actual demand and supply prices for mitigation problematic.
In turn, these uncertainties, magnified by the strategic behavior nations may
adopt to take advantage of their presence, may render unproductive
multilateral negotiations, whose search for mitigation-based solutions depends
on realistic estimates of these values. A perceived risk of failure to resolve the
constitutional problems of a mitigation regime results in the emergence of
adaptation as the dominant default strategy for climate change.
I1l. DUAL SHIFTS: DEREGULATION AND ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS
The politics of climate change are complicated not only by the confusion
that surrounds the basic choice between mitigation or adaptation, but by
alternative institutional models, through which mitigation solutions might be
pursued. The first of these might be called a regulation/transfer fund model
(called in the FCCC a financial mechanism). It represents the familiar
standard in the design of international mechanisms for managing collective
47. If consumers could borrow to finance efficient lighting with larger front-end costs, it would not
be necessary for utilities to distribute subsidized light bulbs whose emissions savings might qualify as JI
projects. As long as electricity prices reflects a social cost charge for GHG emissions, consumers in this new
financial framework would have the ability to choose whether or not they preferred mitigation.
48. FCCC, supra note 2, arts. 11-12; Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments to
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537, art. 10.
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action problems. 9  This model would function through a multilateral
acceptance of a global cap on net GHG emissions and a commitment by
nations party to the regime to limit their national emissions to quotas, whose
sum would equal the overall target. Each party would then define a national
regulatory structure to ensure compliance with its national cap. The parties
would either be compensated from, or contribute to, some sort of international
fund, composed of public monies and linked to the climate change regime.
The allocation formula by which national quotas would be set and the measure
of each party's distribution from, or contribution to, the fund would be
politically determined.
A second category of the regime would rely principally on economic
instruments, like tradable permits or taxes, which, in the main, constitute a
departure from orthodox international practice. Like the regulation/transfer
fund scenario, the typical starting point for an economic instruments model
assumes global agreement on an optimal tax, or global cap, on GHG emissions
and an allocation among nations party to the regime of these obligations.
Unlike the regulation/transfer fund model, however, the forms of compliance
and the volume of transfers would be determined more through private actions
in an international environmental goods and services market rather than
through political rule. Such a departure demands that climate change
proponents confront a dual disjunction that always poses political difficulties.
Instituting a costly set of commitments to reduce GHG emissions, largely
for the sake of future generations, is not an easy task. In addition, the conflicts
associated with the advocacy of relatively untraditional legal instruments make
the job of discovering and maintaining a winning coalition still harder.
Reformers generally do well to avoid campaigns which combine two
disjunctive issues that do not have overlapping constituencies. Yet, in the case
49. Regulation/transfer fund models are also important in regional environmental politics. The
accession of Mediterranean nations like Spain and Portugal to the stricter environmental standards of the
European Community was compensated by transfers from Brussels through the structural funds mechanism.
See Aguilar, supra note 37; Gary Marks, Structural Policy in the European Community, in EURO-POLITICS
191 (Alberta M. Sbragia ed., 1992). A similar instrument may be described in the North American Free
Trade Agreement with regard to increased environmental standards in Mexico and a special border fund to
defray added costs. See Jeffery Atik, Environmental Standards Within NAFTA: Difference by Design and
the Retreat from Harmonization, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 81 (1995). The failure to include a similar
"acidification fund" to help poorer East European states comply with obligations under the 1885 and 1994
Sulfur Protocols of the European Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution has been blamed
for non-compliance in these areas. See Levy, supra note 3, at 65-66 (citing Johan Sliggers & Ger Klaassen,
Cost Sharing for the Abatement of Acidification in Europe: The Missing Link in the Sulphur Protocol
(1993) (paper prepared for the Working Group on Strategies, Executive Body for the Convention on Long
Range Transboundary Air Pollution)).
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of climate change, the linkage of commitments and instruments may no longer
be escapable.
The period around the end of the Cold War has been marked by an
unprecedented interest in establishing unencumbered markets and the virtues
of competition. This interest has moved toward the reconstitution of the
internal governance structures of many nations. One line of reform in
domestic systems experiments with the replacement of public monopolies, as
suppliers of social goods, by distributing vouchers for private services or by
fostering competition between public agencies and private firms.
A second market-oriented innovation is the substitution for standard
setting or best practice regulation of economic instruments, including social
cost taxes or property rights. In these cases, the state sets either the price of
factors external to unregulated markets (taxes), or the quantity of a collective
harm allowed (quotas or permits). The state then allows the market to decide
how to minimize resource costs.' Although these initiatives have been largely
concentrated at the domestic level, the same anti-regulatory logic applies to
existing and prospective international regimes. To all but ideological purists,
it is clear that in particular situations, including the presence of common
property resources, markets alone are not able to allocate resources optimally.
Recognizing the exposed infirmities of orthodox instruments of regulation
offers no way out of the dilemmas of internalizing social costs and benefits.
Rather, the force of the argument for economic instruments lies in the belief
that the costs associated with bureaucratic organization, as the primary tool for
environmental management, can be reduced by means of periodic, but limited,
public interventions. These public interventions structure incentives so that
rational private actors are induced to pursue market-correcting behaviors.
Pressures on governments to build a climate change regime that relies on
economic instruments come from the theoretical faith and recent deregulatory
experience of key domestic constituencies in the business and economics
communities. The position of business interests toward climate change, an
ongoing concern of the process of institution-building inaugurated at Rio, is
politically complex. In some mythical world, producers would prefer to
continue consuming environmental services free of charge. The strategic
behavior of capital will frequently aim to protect this first best option and, in
50. For the theory of economic instruments and bibliography to the broad economic literature, see
Cropper & Oates, supra note 12, at 678-85. For an applied view of these choices within a different policy
tradition, see generally CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN EC
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1993). -
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denying the need for any collective action, act to disguise preferences among
its second best collective action solutions. A growing segment of the business
community, however has recognized that treating the environment as a free
production good is no longer a realistic or desirable goal. Faced with a
necessary choice between traditional regulatory mechanisms and economic
instruments, the advantages of the latter, for organizations whose expertise is
least cost production, are apparent.5
Economists, on the other hand, are far less hesitant in describing the shape
of their ideal environmental regime.5" The profession shares a wide consensus
that encourages tradable permits, or pollution taxes, because regimes founded
upon these instruments are most amenable to a design that mirrors the
orthodox compendium of economic desiderata such as:
(1) reliance on deep markets with low costs of search and exchange and
secure compensation for the exchange of legally acknowledged property
rights;
(2) recognition that collective action problems are real, but best
approached and solved through a minimal introduction of specialized
bureaucracies that develop independent agency interests and produce
systematic distortions of resource allocations;
(3) commitment to deregulated forms of public intervention that approach
collective action problems by giving private actors price incentives, which
lead them to use least cost options for market correction and tend to reduce
political opposition to the enactment and implementation of allocative
policies;
51. In this vein, during the preparation for the Earth Summit, the World Business Council For
Sustainable Development (WBCSD), published Changing Course which proposed an agenda for
collaboration between the business community and public and non-profit actors concerned with the global
environment. STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY, BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, CHANGING
COURSE: A GLOBAL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992). The
WBCSD recognized that the successful design and implementation of the fundamental social institutions
of developed societies, from a modem telecommunications infrastructure to social security, have grown from
a cooperative relation between government and the leading edge of business. An inability to forge a
common commitment to new policy initiatives shared between empowered elements of the public and
private sectors has been the usual hallmark of failures to adapt to the challenges of modernity. Second,
Changing Course asserted that better functioning institutions of advanced political economies were managed
by means of economic incentives rather than bureaucratic regulation. See id.; see also ROB GRAY ET AL.,
ACCOUNTING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1993).
52. See Cropper & Oates, supra note 12, at 687-97.
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(4) low cost monitoring of the ways in which resources are actually
employed to verify compliance with contractual and financial obligations
assumed in market transactions. These monitoring strategies should rely,
wherever possible, on the use of incentives, such that those affected by
these transactions have private interests (such as employment possibilities
or reputation effects) in complying with legal obligations;
(5) decentralized systems that are able to learn and retain flexibility in a
context of substantial uncertainty and risk;
(6) comprehensive regimes (inclusive markets and policies) so that
economic actors are not induced to substitute actions that escape the reach
of the system. These induced behaviors are less desirable to private actors
and do little to lessen the public problem which the regime was intended
to ameliorate.
For other groups interested in the process of creating a climate change
regime, the level of comfort with, and attraction to, tradable permits or social
cost taxes is generally lower. These actors are often drawn from political
practice or communities like law or ethics, with a strong normative orientation
in their professional canon. Accordingly, they both distrust the loss of
administrative control and object to the historical injustice they see as the
consequences of shifting from a regulation/transfer fund to an economic
instruments model for GHG mitigation.
This reluctance to ride the new wave in public policy design can be traced
to the political and economic differences in the nature and extent of the
environmental obligations imposed by the alternative regime forms. These
differences can be highlighted if we contrast a tradable permits model with
national regulatory controls and a complementary multinational fund, which
is the competing institutional order now reflected in the FCCC. As discussed
above, the normal vision of either the regulation/transfer model or the tradable
permits model assumes that a global cap on emissions has been negotiated
along with a formula, by which nations participating in the regime allocate the
global target among themselves. In the regulatory/fund scenario, the cost to
a signatory state will be the sum of its domestic marginal cost of reducing
emissions to its target amount, and the amount it must contribute to, or receive
from, the multilateral fund. These costs would, in turn, be functions of the
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particular national and international rules created to structure the allocation
caps and the financial mechanism.
In a classical national system, signatory states would mandate best
available practice standards, or other specific control technologies and
processes, to ensure compliance with the national quota. The net cost of
financial transfers would vary with the political decision procedures and voting
rules by which contributions to, and distributions from, a multilateral fund are
administered.3 By contrast a full tradable permits system would allow each
participating state to meet its emissions quota through the use of a
comprehensive trading system. This system would divide up the national
allocation of emission rights among domestic public and private actors and
allow them to choose how best to comply with this limitation at the least
possible cost.' National costs of compliance would be the outcome of private
mitigation decisions. To the extent that international trading of emissions
quotas took place, there would be an automatic transfer of resources from
actors buying relief from obligations, to actors selling such services. The size
53. See IPCC RESPONSE, supra note 21, at 249-55; see also IAN A. BOWIES & GLENN T. PRICKETT,
REFRAMING THE GREEN WINDOw: AN ANALYSIS OF THE GEF PILOT PHASE APPROACH TO BIODivEPSrrY
AND GLOBAL WARMING AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OPERATIONAL PHASE 27-34 (1994); IRVING M.
MINTZER, IMPLEMENTING THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: INCREMENTAL COSTS AND
THE ROLE OF GEF 3-6 (Global Environment Facility Working Paper No. 4, 1993); DENNIS ANDERSON &
ROBERT H. WILLIAMS, THE COST-EFFECnVENESS OF GEF PROJECTS (Global Environment Facility Working
Paper No. 6, 1993).
54. An example of a full tradable permits system is the American implementation of the Montreal
Protocol. National (diminishing) caps on the production and consumption of CFCs and halons were
allocated among United States producers and importers of the controlled substances. Trading in these
emissions rights is permitted at both the domestic and international levels. Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 14, art. 2; Henry A. Waxman, Overview and Critique: An
Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1797-1807. It would also be
possible to combine different economic instruments in a single regime. International rights to emit,
themselves tradable, might be domestically implemented by an appropriate lax, with or without offset credits
for international action. A creditable carbon tax as a domestic tool for GHG controls has been debated
recently in Norway as one possible mode of JI development. See Torleif Haugland et al., A Review and
Comparison of CO2 Taxes in the Nordic Countries, in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A PRACTICAL TAX SYSTEM 25 (1992).
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and distribution of these transfers between nations would be dependent on the
market price of the environmental services contracted."
Presented as polar alternatives, the principal axis of divergence between
the classical regulation/transfer and economic instruments models is their
differential reliance on political and economic rules in approaching collective
action issues. Given a global cap and a formula to allocate the global target
among regime participants, the tradable permits system substitutes economic
for political choice in two ways. First, the selection of mitigation strategies is
private and international rather than public and national. Second, the amount
of international fund transfers is set by the market through contracts
conditioned on the production of mitigating activities, rather than by political
judgments about the amounts to be transferred and the circumstances which
define the context in which transfers will occur.
Yet, it would be a mistake to believe that this movement from politics
toward economics is more than a redistribution of power over collective action
problems. Politics will continue to be important in part because elements
drawn from pure regulatory or market models can be combined in various
patterns that rearrange the boundary between the political and economic
domains. For example, the community of nations may embrace a multilateral
regime that proscribes international trading and mandates a transfer fund.
Individual parties to the regime may adopt a domestic system of tradable
permits. Alternatively, the global regime may create a financial instrument
whose voting rules give nations who are net contributors to the fund a veto
over resource transfers not directly tied to improved environmental quality.
55. In theory the same effect could be achieved through an international system of nationally variable
taxes or emissions charges on greenhouse gases. See Gunnar S. Eskeland, A Presumptive Pigovian Tax:
Complementing Regulation to Mimic an Emissions Fee (Dec. 1993) (paper presented at Conference on
Market Approaches to Environmental Protection, Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford
University, on file with author); Olivier Godard, Taxes, in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE (1993). The transfer
element would come through the international pattern of collection of tax revenues after emissions locations
decisions were made in a comprehensive global market. In practice, because of asymmetries in knowledge
about the relative values of environmental and economic damages, and because of differences in
administrative costs, either taxes or permits may be more efficient in particular situations. See Martin L.
Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REv. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974). Taxes alter the cost of emissions, but
do not fix their quantity. Reliance on emissions taxes may pose a problem in jurisdictions where there is
a traditional reliance on energy or fuel taxes. If nations adjust other taxes on these activities downward to
offset a global carbon or GHG tax, the net effect on quantity of emissions can be ambiguous. Quantity caps
avoid this dilemma. On the experience with national level carbon taxes, see generally ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A PRACTICAL TAX SYSTEM
(1992).
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The conditions attached to these transfers may be viewed by recipient nations
as manifestations of economic power that compromise their political
sovereignty. Still more fundamentally, even in a regime which relies heavily
on tradable permits, there is a need for political choice to allocate the
emissions rights and liabilities that set the market in motion and to coordinate
an effective contracting system. Consequently, the normative argument for
economic instruments is less a wholesale substitution of economic choice rules
for political decisions than a shift toward an enlarged domain of the economic.
Political choice underlies a mitigation regime based on tradable permits
and international markets because the overall cost of participation in the
regime for any nation is contingent on the depth of its commitment to limit
GHG emissions and the formula by which it acquires its stock of emissions
rights. Other things being equal, the marginal costs of compliance would grow
as a nation deepened its commitment to mitigate net GHG emissions. This
would be true even though trade would allow nations with deep commitments
to compare the cost of reducing net emissions within their own jurisdiction to
the cost of purchasing the requisite number of offsets on the international
market. Since there are many competing possible formulae that could vastly
alter the allocation of permits that different nations receive, the price of
mitigation and the volume of income transfers associated with economic
instruments would ultimately depend on the political decisions that establish
the commitment targets and allocation rules.
For example, if tradable permits were assigned to nations by reference to
their national populations at a chosen date, the resulting allocation would
permit large emissions growth in the Third World and induce a
correspondingly larger transfer from less populated, wealthier states with
obligations to reduce their historical emissions levels. 6 By contrast, if the
political choice were to allocate permits in order to grandfather existing per
capita emissions levels, emissions-intensive development in the Third World
would be curtailed and concomitant transfers from current emitters would be
minimized. Obviously, there are many possible variables and combinations
of variables with which to allocate allowances that would alter the prospective
56. See SCowr BARRETT, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATIONS (1992); Adam Rose & Brandt
Stevens, The Efficiency and Equity of Marketable Permits for CO, Emissions, 15 RESOURCE & ENERGY
ECON. 117 (1993); Peter Sturm, The Efficiency of Greenhouse Gas Emission Abatement and International
Equity (June 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the School of Applied and International
Economics, Massey University).
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balance of costs and transfers posed by these simple options. 7 To the extent,
however, that establishing some cap or allocation rule is the condition
precedent to a regime incorporating emissions rights, the conflicting politics
of environment and economic growth are buried in the core of the system's
genesis.
Linking the independently contestable politics of commitments and
instruments may have a detrimental impact on the success of multilateral
negotiations. For any state or private organization assigned rights and
liabilities for GHG emissions, its mitigation costs are a function of the direct
costs incurred in reducing domestic emissions and any transfers it makes
buying further rights to emit. The maximum cost that industrial nations would
be willing to pay for mitigation is an empirical question. To establish an
effective mitigation regime, this amount must include transfers to compensate
developing nations for the net economic damage caused by their accession to
the regime. This damage would reflect the difference between the growth
foregone, the incremental costs of emissions-reducing measures undertaken to
comply with their commitments and the local environmental costs avoided in
those developing nations. In theory, simulation exercises indicate that with
some allocation rules such a range of gains from trade may exist."
In practice, each nation will judge the viability of its participation in any
prospective regime by evaluating the particular global emissions caps and
allocation rules that define the commitments to which it must adhere and
determining the total costs it must assume. Since estimates of total costs will
depend on both commitments and available instruments for compliance,
57. Leading proposals for the political rules by which to constitute a global market in which
economic instruments may be efficiently traded include: Jean Charles Hourcade & Richard Baron,
Tradeable Permits, in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 11 (1993); Tom Tietenberg & David G. Victor, Possible
Administrative Structures and Procedures, in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, COMBATING GLOBAL WARMING: POSSIBLE RULES, REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS FOR A GLOBAL MARKET IN CO2 EMISSION ENTITLEMENTS 1 (1994); Richard L. Sandor et
al., Model Rules and Regulations for a Global C0 2 Emissions Credit Market, in id at 61; SCoTr BARRETT,
THE STRATEGY OF JOINT IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (1995);
HANS-JOCHEN LUHMANN ET AL., WUPPERTAL INSTITrE, MAKING JOINT IMPLEMENTATION OPERATIONAL:
SOLUTIONS FOR SOME TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS OF JI IN THE FOSSIL FUEL POWER SECTOR
(1995); Richard L. Sandor & Frank T. Joshua, Building a Global CO, Emissions Trading System: The
UNCTAD Initiative (Sept. 1995) (paper presented at the Wall Street Journal Europe/Handelsblatt
Conference, International Energy Markets, in Vienna, on file with author). For an outline of the complex
agenda of political action needed to implement an effective JI regime based on an alternative trade and cap
strategy, see infra part V.
58. See Rose & Stevens, supra note 17.
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nations considering subscription to a climate change regime must be able to
forecast the particular pattern of rules and the associated costs they will be
facing. In the absence of a close correspondence between national preferences
on commitments and instruments, consensus on any single set of regime rules
is less likely. Nations that agree on the goal of an international regime may
disagree on the question of how to get there. States that concur on the need for
a specific level of GHG mitigation may have strong and opposing beliefs about
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the efficacy and equity of alternative regulatory techniques.59 A lack of
59. The preference of the multilateral community for the regulation/transfer model is rooted in
distinct, but convergent themes of diplomatic culture. First, expert regulation is the hallmark of the nation-
state. In nineteenth century Europe, where modem diplomacy matured, bureaucratic states legitimated
themselves primarily by their technical competence in defining and administering the well-being (education,
health, labor markets, and social insurance) of their domestic populations. Diplomacy internalized these
norms of state action into the principles of nation states as sovereign actors that now dominate international
law. In effect, regulation is the expression and proof of national autonomy, and the prime justification for
the concept of noninterference that underlies diplomatic practice. Regulation is also reflected in the
cognitive approaches of UN agencies which are prominent in the environmental field. For example, climate
change research often takes the form of country studies, with sophisticated exercises of central planning for
national energy development. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME COLLABORATING CENTRE
ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, UNEP GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT COSTING STUDIES (1994); CARBON
EMISSIONS CONTROL STRATEGIES: CASE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (William U. Chandler
ed., 1990). While I do not contest the skill of these reports, I want to point out that the ideal of extensive
regulation, though contested by the emergent emphasis on markets in many polities, may remain at its zenith
in the international culture of diplomacy. See M.S. ANDERSON, THE RISE OF MODERN DIPLOMACY 1450-
1919, at 103-49 (1993).
Second, the concept of a transfer fund coheres more with the defining characteristics of multilateral
diplomacy than do transfers effected through market transactions. The debate over historical responsibility
for the asymmetry between rich and poor nations has been an organizing heuristic for international politics.
The South has often suggested that past exploitation by the North ought to be expressed in some form of
reparations. Transfers would have the character of reparations only if they were unconditional.
Accordingly, transfers like those in Jl, which are limited to investments in environmental quality, would fail
this test, On the other hand, it is possible that transfers deposited by the North in a multilateral fund, might
be less restricted in their uses. The degree to which conditions are actually attached to the disbursement of
transfers will depend on the voting rules by which the financial mechanism operates. In addition, the
concept of a transfer fund implies that the contributions to it, whether in cash or technology, come from
public sources. The financial relations are state to state. Again, this position reifies the diplomatic norm
that states are the relevant actors in international systems. To act through a political fund is to reinforce the
power of national states and, thereby, the diplomatic and international bureaus who constitute and staff the
consequent regimes.
The proclivity of the diplomatic community to build regulation/transfer institutions reflects the natural
tendency of any organization to reproduce its internal constitution. In the case of climate change, however,
it creates a kind of shadow play that obscures the possibility of solving the current impasse. Multilateral
negotiations seem to chase ghosts of centralized regulation, reparations, and nonexistent public stocks of
money and technologies for transfer instead of working in the reality of market-based instruments,
conditionality, and the need to mobilize private resources. The shadow play of transfers spills over into the
JI market, as well. Since the concept of JI has been introduced to developing nations and NGOs in the
context of FCCC diplomacy, they have frequently understood it through the familiar cognitive frame of
multilateral aid. The evaluation of aid projects reflects political principles that are often at odds with
business criteria for project evaluation. The bulk of JI proposals are small scale, without financial return
or business development prospects, and lacking any realistic evaluation of political risk. This may be
appropriate in a culture of public transfers or grants. It has little appeal to investors concerned with
infrastructure development. If the shadow play is endemic to the multilateral diplomatic forum because it
is genetically embedded in its cognitive field, then relocating the constitution of a climate change regime
in a less restricted forum should be considered.
Beyond the shadow play, the preference for regulatory, rather than market-based, regimes is also a
product of the voting rules and political practices of the FCCC. The recognition in that forum of the primacy
of national sovereignty and the practice of decision by consensus shifts relative power to actors in the South
where familiarity with and confidence in market instruments may be weakest. Developing states argue that
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correlation between the politics of the ends and means may lead to the
fragmentation of potentially winning coalitions for any specific proposed
climate change regime. This would reduce the probability that multilateral
negotiations will yield a theoretically available bargain.
The current contest over the appropriate form of public policy for
correcting market failures may also alter the likelihood that key actors will opt
for adaptation as a default strategy rather than commit to a mitigation regime.
We assume that rational nations seek a portfolio of actions that minimize their
total cost of response to climate change. The cost of adaptation will set a
threshold beyond which a nation or organization would be unwilling to pay
more in aggregate cost of transfer payments and domestic compliance
associated with mitigation. In other words, if the cost of mitigation strategies
is a well-constructed portfolio of direct measures'to mitigate net emissions and
purchases of additional emissions rights, a nation will opt out of a mitigation
regime at the point where it becomes cheaper to live with higher temperatures.
At that point, it will invest in all of the behavioral adaptations that are efficient
in the warmer climate.
Consequently, if a nation faces a steep cost curve for mitigating its net
emissions to a proposed commitment level, and if there are restrictions on its
ability to reduce these costs through the use of market instruments, adaptation
rather than mitigation will be more likely to dominate its climate change
strategy. Political disputes about the form of regulation affect the capacity of
nations to predict the total cost of mitigating climate change. These disputes
push nations with a low adaptation threshold away from subscription and
toward a mitigation regime. • This observation recognizes that huge
JI markets would result in the sale of the best mitigation opportunities (low hanging fruit) at low prices to
foreign investors. They suggest that the South would not be able to defend its own interests in complex JI
deals. See HELLER, supra note 8, at 36-44. In as much as developing states are active in a variety of other
investment markets and insist on their sovereign capacity to manage other stocks of depletable assets (like
oil), I wonder if these arguments against markets should be interpreted as bargaining tactics over the price
to be paid by northern nations for a mitigation regime. If, however, the advocacy of regulation is a tactic,
rather than a norm of diplomatic culture, then the successful opposition at COP-I to JI may signal an
overestimation of the North's willingness to pay for mitigation. In this case, the multilateral forum may
contribute in a different way to a bargaining impasse. Because of the practice of bloc voting in international
negotiations over regimes, the costs of organizing a cartel have already been paid. The Southern bloc will
be tempted to seek a monopoly return for its supply of mitigation services. To the extent that pervasive
uncertainty leads the cartel to underestimate the cost at which Northern nations may switch to adaptation,
potential solutions to the negotiation may be lost. Again, this would counsel opening a competing climate
change forum in which other expressions of demand and supply prices may be explored.
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uncertainties are attached to the idea of adaptation costs. 6° The ultimate choice
between mitigation and adaptation strategies may be unaffected by the
incremental costs of negotiating a mitigation regime, that arise from
disagreement over the better model of public policy through which mitigation
60. As noted above, these calculations might turn on speculative estimates about the costs of
insulating nations of immigration from nations of emigration in a world where flooding, desertification, and
broadened ranges of epidemic disease cause widespread population displacements. Even more uncertainty
in these guesses arises from the fact that it is the marginal costs of environmental security that are the
relevant measure of adaptation costs. For example, the added costs of border protection may be low in the
North given the other potential causes of social and economic instability in many regions where the impacts
of climate change are likely to be relatively severe. In Europe and America, recent reductions in immigration
and asylum flows and reinforced policing of borders may already signal the onset of a policy commitment
to adaptation at home rather than to mitigating in the Third World the causes of social disorder that provokes
migration. See Thomas Heller, The Common Foreign and Security Policy, in THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION: SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISION (T.M.C. Asser Institute ed., forthcoming 1996).
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ought to be pursued. My argument is only directional, and it points in the
direction of default. 6'
IV. THE CHINA TRAP: TIME WINDOWS AND THE VIABILITY OF MITIGATION
I have argued that there is a high risk that complexity in the politics of
establishing a mitigation regime may lead northern nations to fall back to
adaptation to climate change as a default strategy. I have attributed this risk
to problems associated with revealing uncertain demand and supply values for
61. Although logic suggests that the issue of instruments should be divorced from the issue of
commitments because a regime should favor minimizing the costs of implementing whatever commitments
are made, this argument has not yet prevailed in climate change negotiations. To the contrary, discussions
on JI, the only economic instrument under current FCCC consideration, were deadlocked at the April 1995
First Conference of the Parties to the FCCC (COP-I) in Berlin because JI advocates could not unbundle it
from the stalled commitments debate.
It might have been argued at COP-I that J should be rejected as a climate change mechanism because
it is only an imperfect proxy for a comprehensive tradable permits regime and, as an incomplete market
instrument, will lead to price distortions and resource misallocations. See Bohm, supra note 1I. These
distortions are often referred to as "leakage" in the sense that the GHG savings generated by one project are
offset (or leak from the system) by increases in GHG emissions due to price changes or resource
displacements caused by or allowed in the incomplete market. For definitions of leakage, see Office of
Policy Planning & Program Evaluation, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Cross-cutting Institutional Issues: Options
Identification Paper for the EPAct Section 1605 Voluntary Reporting Program (Oct. 25, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with U.S. Department of Energy).
Leakage will present a problem in developing nations that do not now have national obligations to
reduce emissions under the FCCC. Because low cost opportunities for emissions reductions through JI
projects are likely to occur in these developing nations, they may be tempted to relax domestic
environmental policies to create more emissions whose reductions may be marketed internationally. For
example, a nation like China may be tempted to move away from its stated goal of reducing coal subsidies,
motivating a continuing misallocation among fuel sources toward coal based electricity generation. In turn,
Australian suppliers of clean coal technologies might seek JI certification in Australia for investments in
reducing the emissions from new coal fired Chinese plants. The reductions brought about by the JI
investment would be additional to what would have otherwise occurred in China only if the business as
usual case, or baseline against which improvement is measured, did not assume the elimination of coal
subsidies.
Leakage and the incentives problems posed by moral hazards are problems which must be solved in
order to sustain a politically viable and environmentally sound JI regime. This is feasible with careful
design. JI was not, however, distinguished on technical grounds from other economic instruments and has
not been legitimated in the FCCC because there emerged no dominant coalition of parties who backed any
particular package of instruments and commitments.
OECD nations might sign a JI protocol among themselves, avoiding the veto of the Group of 77
nations who opposed its adoption in Berlin because of their disagreements with the North over commitments
and financial transfers. In this case, the ongoing disagreements over whether commitments must be assumed
by all parties to the FCCC and the size and character of the financial instrument would be enacted in a forum
outside the FCCC negotiations. The unbundling of JI from the commitments deadlock would open an
indirect path to obtaining commitments through their decentralized negotiation in a competitive market. The
conditions under which this alternative scenario could unfold are briefly sketched in concluding points II-
15. See infra part V, points 11-15.
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mitigation, and with the coupling of the negotiations over mitigation
commitments and new economic instruments like JI. In this section, I wish to
suggest that the choice between adaptation and mitigation strategies may also
have a time dimension, that adds further hazard to the constitution of a
multilateral regime. Even positing that there was a negotiating consensus on
a hypothetical future target for GHG emissions (e.g., stabilized global GHG
emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2050), we may still imagine that the
mitigation schedule might develop along one of several possible time paths.
The international community could act to change the partial derivative of
GHG emissions in the short term, or to plan for a much larger reduction later,
when more information about scientific and economic effects may be known.62
The deferral of mitigation action, however, may tip the dominant response
strategy toward adaptation, especially for key industrial nations which face
relatively low damage from global warming. In other words, if path
dependencies are associated with the actions taken in emissions-intensive
sectors, like energy and transportation in fast-growing, large economies like
China, enough warming may occur to cause some nations to take local actions
to protect themselves against the effects of this change. In such a case, nations
with a low adaptation threshold must commit to a mitigation regime before the
behaviors that initiate path-dependent development occur. If they do not
commit in time, their defection will push the global system into an adaptive
equilibrium. The logic of this contingent scenario is outlined below.
Although policy analysis may decide that the absolute costs of mitigation
are less than adaptation, it remains possible that the most economical
mitigation options may only be available within restricted time windows.
Unless a sufficiently large number of parties to the climate change regime
decide for mitigation within this time window, the receding horizon of low-
62. Because it is the cumulative GHG concentrations that produce climate effects, it is possible in
theory to subtract the necessary quantity of GHG emissions at any time in the build-up process. Advocates
of mitigation have presented this problem as a choice between smaller current investments or larger future
costs. Some recent studies have gone further and argued that the better policy for climate change is to defer
current action in favor of more scientific research and technological innovation. See W. David Montgomery,
Developing a Framework for Short- and Long-Run Decisions on Climate Change Policies, in AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE ON CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES 15 (Charls E. Walker et al., American Council for Capital
Formation, eds., 1996); Jae Edmonds & Marshall Wise, Stabilizing Atmospheric CO,: Rethinking the
Emissions Problem, in id at 75. The "China Trap" hypothesis would suggest that each of these views is too
sanguine. If deferred action means that some nations cross a tipping point between mitigation and
adaptation, then there is more at stake than cheap or expensive mitigation. Similarly, if current emissions
growth is associated with path dependent investment, then the volume of emissions to be managed is not
independent of the timing of commitment to a climate change regime.
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cost projects may lead to an inversely cresting preference for adaptation.
Consider the path dependent trajectory of what might be called the "China
Trap."
In considering this scenario, assume first that China's GHG emissions will
increase from its installation of an energy-transportation infrastructure with a
useful life of forty to fifty years. 3 The costs of retrofitting an installed base of
private and public capital built on coal technologies and the heavy use of
trucks and autos can be, as experience in the United States would suggest,
prohibitively high. Second, assume that global change models indicate that
China's additional emissions from its newly installed base will produce a
warming level "X" unless China adopts, and is able to enforce, domestic
regulations to internalize the predicted environmental costs of its emissions.
Third, facing unavoidable warming level X, assume that it becomes
economically rational for a wealthy northern state to invest in a policy
response "Y" to adapt to the damages threatened by its climate change.
Fourth, assume that adaptation investment Y is lumpy, in the sense that
once the investment has been made, it will manage damages over a wider
range of temperature change than the level X which induced the investment.
For example, once a sea wall is constructed, or an agricultural production
pattern reconfigured, the incremental costs imposed by further warming over
a defined range might be inconsequential.
Finally, note that once the adaptation expenditure has been made, prior
investments aimed at mitigation will be rendered inutile. As long as actors are
forced by warming level X to do Y, and Y is effective as a climate change
response within the entire temperature variation from present levels up to a
defined level beyond X, it is irrational to spend any more than the cost of Y.
This argument implies that if industrial nations expect additional emissions
in China, or elsewhere in the Third World, will reach certain levels, they may
decide that adaptation strategies are their best option. They may attribute the
expected emissions growth to domestic political opposition into new
environmental obligations or to the enactment of ineffective controls in
63. See Collin Green et al., Energy Module, in RAINS-ASIA: AN ASSESSMENT MODEL FOR AIR
POLLUTION IN ASIA, at 111-1 (Wes Foell et al. eds., 1995); VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY IN CHINA'S
MODERNIZATION: ADVANCES AND LIMITATIONS (1988); Vaclav Smil, Energy and the Environment Issues
for APEC: Why China Matters Most (Oct. 31, 1995) (unpublished paper, on file with author); GEF China
Report, supra note 7, at 16-55.
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developing nations.' Whatever the cause, either an unwillingness or an
inability to control GHG emissions that results in the installation of an
emissions-intensive capital base that will depreciate over an extended period,
may undermine the logic of the case for mitigation. An effective international
regime must implement collective action to induce or require investment in an
alternative energy-transportation infrastructure, with lower emissions potential
before the pursuit of business as usual springs the China Trap.
The China Trap suggests that the negotiation of a multilateral regime for
climate change demands both agreement on mitigation options, whose total
costs are less than forecast adaptation costs, and commitment to the regime.
The agreement and the commitment must succeed in time to shift the behavior
of key growing economies, from emissions-heavy to emissions-reducing
development paths. The regime design would have to include national
reductions in emissions or emission growth rates in all major emitting states,
transfer payments necessary to induce this widespread participation, and
assurance to contributor states that their financial transfers will actually result
in mitigation. The contingencies in China (and other countries in transition)
about the effective reach of the legal system, the bureaucratic rivalries that
impose political risk on projects that rely on a stable regulatory environment,
and the deeply embedded North-South conflicts over the equities of
international regimes, militate against this third condition. Uncertainties about
64. China has led the political opposition to JI in the G-77 bloc. This initiative in the FCCC forum
seems rooted in a broader Chinese international agenda that emphasizes China's role as a major power,
prepared to jibe at the West across a range of issues, register, as a standard bearer, the historical claims of
the developing world, and stress the security concerns of China as a sovereign actor resistant to Western
intrusions. Although the militancy of the international stance may belie more divided politics at home, the
possibility that opposition may persist will make subscription by other nations to a mitigation regime risky.
In addition, it is not clear that China could adhere to effective commitments on GHG emissions constraints.
Current patterns of energy development are based heavily on coal powered plants which are often at a sub-
optimal scale and are operated by local enterprises or municipalities, with limited access to capital markets,
and free of environmental controls. Incentives to alter these patterns are weak at present. See LESTER ROSS,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA 130-75 (1988); ShOL, supra note 26, at 99-137.
J1 investment by Western energy companies would present problems of security of return, continuing
uncertainties about subsidies and energy price reforms, and assertions of sovereign limits on the monitoring
of contractual commitments. Legal enforcement of these contracts is also problematic. On the other hand,
China is aware of massive capital needs for energy and transportation infrastructure, and increasingly
concerned about domestic pollution from sulfates and nitrates produced by fossil fuels. There are large
stocks of JI opportunities in energy efficiency and clean coal upgrading that promise long term benefits from
improved infrastructure. Japan, and Korea, in particular, have associated interests in energy sector J1 to
reduce vulnerability to acid rain. Whether these considerations will countervail Chinese diplomatic
resistance to J1, or alleviate the general problems of capital intensive foreign investment in China, remains
an open question which must be resolved rapidly.
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time windows, and their implications for potential mitigation solutions, may
only add to the forces pushing toward adaptation as a default case. The
argument portends that neither the FCCC negotiations nor alternative
processes should count on the luxury of deferral in developing a mitigation
regime.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTUS
The discussion of joint implementation in this paper should be understood
in the context of the disenchantment with orthodox instruments of regulation
and the emergent quest to design and develop economic instruments adequate
to address the collective action problems posed by global climate change. The
orthodox view has been that these problems will best be solved through
multilateral negotiations, aimed at a comprehensive mitigation regime for
GHGs, that designs and implements a cap and trade system.
My argument is that JI is better seen as an escape path from the disabilities
of the diplomatic forum, which relies on competitive trading to define the
environmental obligations of different nations in a climate change regime.
This argument is outlined in the following propositions:
(1) The aim of an international regime for climate change is to develop
economic instruments that encourage and permit actors to be efficient and
innovative in internalizing environmental costs.
(2) The establishment of property rights to emit carbon and carbon-
equivalent gases and a comprehensive global trading market in those rights
is one important means of achieving this goal.
(3) The most problematic aspect of establishing a property rights-based
system is the allocation (initial assignment) of rights. This process is
exceptionally problematic because of three inter-related difficulties:
demand revelation in uncertainty, dual shift, and limited time windows.
These difficulties add up to pervasive uncertainties about the relative costs
of mitigation and adaptation, and a systematic tendency to incorrectly
estimate and disguise negotiation positions.
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(4) The nations involved in the multilateral negotiations in the post-Rio
diplomatic forum have been able to agree on a soft partial allocation
formula only among the developed nations.
(5) The nations participating in multilateral negotiations have been unable
to agreed on a global formula for rights assignment. The principal reasons
for skepticism about forum specific problems in braking free of
negotiation deadlock are related to the culture of diplomacy, which favors
national and regulatory over private and market mechanisms; the
privileged place of international law and consensual decision rules in the
diplomatic forum; the historical embeddedness of North-South blocs with
conflicting analytical heuristics to interpret political obligations; and the
concern of diplomats to establish reputation effects in a wider agenda of
security, trade and other international concerns. These concerns often take
precedence over the importance of environmental issues.65
(6) If political authorities continue to be unable to agree upon a global
allocation of emission rights, the development of the international regime
first requires the development of a functional substitute for them.
(7) If the direct multilateral route to a global regime is blocked, the
substitute determination of allocations must be pursued indirectly on a
multi-local (unilateral, bilateral, minilateral, or regional) basis.
(8) Joint implementation can be understood as the most practical forum
in which to develop such a multi-local process for setting the allocations
of emissions rights (JI baselines).
(9) Joint implementation is an imperfect and partial step toward a global
trading system, that has important economic similarities to, and
differences from, a comprehensive regime based on a deep market in
tradable permits. JI does not, however, require agreement on universal
allocations of rights to begin operating. However, it does require key
developed (GHG buyer) nations to acceptance some obligations to
65. The arguments that the character of the diplomatic forum magnifies, rather than lessens, the
difficulties of establishing a climate change regime have been developed elsewhere. See supra notes 17,
18, and 59.
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mitigate. It also requires the initiation of a market into which key (GHG
seller) nations may bid for shares of investment funds, qualified by their
mitigation effects on GHG emissions.
(10) For the joint implementation process to evolve toward a
comprehensive regime, the process of creating allocations multi-locally
cannot be blocked by those same multilateral institutions unable to agree
directly on an allocation formula; multilateral negotiations should not
regulate or otherwise substantially restrict the global market for JI
projects.
(11) Forjoint implementation to develop along the proper path, the home
jurisdictions of investors in JI projects must establish effective national
incentives (environmental assets and liabilities) for private actors to
undertake appropriate action and set the rules and baselines for project
qualification. Although defining the criteria for JI project qualification
poses difficult analytical problems," the volume of qualified capital flows
approved by the qualification process can provide material evidence about
the actual demand price these GHG buyer nations are willing to pay for
GHG mitigation.
(12) For joint implementation to so evolve, the host nations of JI
investment must individually decide whether they wish to participate in
this international market and, if they do, assimilate JI projects to their
general regimes for foreign investment. Again, in theory, the willingness
of less developed nations to bid (by means of bilateral and other
agreements to maintain or enhance environmental quality in their nations)
in a competitive market for JI capital flows is a revelation of the supply
price of GHG mitigation. Through trading under appropriate qualification
processes, buyers and sellers, in effect, negotiate multi-locally JI baselines
which are the functional equivalents of national emissions caps. The
allocation of national emission caps, the allocation of which is now stalled
in the FCCC negotiations.
(13) JI projects should be rated as better qualified when they are located
in nations which enter into bilateral or mini-lateral agreements committing
66. See supra notes 8 and 46.
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them to environmental standards or other policies related to GHG
emissions, such as energy pricing reforms. Competitive markets for
favorable JI investment ratings can lead to rising environmental baselines
in a process of decentralized negotiations.
(14) The dynamics of the JI game are complex and will demand
coordination among leading buyer nations to prevent the articulation of
loose qualification rules that result in a race to the bottom-incentives to
seller nations to lower environmental quality in order to have more
emissions reduction projects to market through JI--and a trade war that
produces a general deterioration of global environmental quality. This
coordination is only possible, however, in markets with a small number of
players able to monitor each other's behavior.
(15) A successfully designed, indirect JI regime will result in an
expanding number of nations seeking to join the game in order to gain a
share of the revealed demand for mitigation. In the end, such a market can
lead to agreement on acceptable levels of mitigation costs and transfers,
now hidden by strategic political behavior, which will eventuate in the
celebration of a comprehensive multilateral regime as the last, rather than
the first, step in building international institutions.
The dynamics outlined in points 11-15 will require detailed explication
elsewhere if JI is to be seriously explored as an indirect road to a
comprehensive climate change regime. Still, there can be no assurance that
this is the only outcome of the realpolitik game or that it can be played out
quickly enough to prevent tipping the system to adaptation. At the least,
competition between multi-local and multilateral institutions over which
system will dominate the political economy of climate change may push us
away from the current torpor that can only lead to default.
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